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 This note seeks to understand the place of a South Asian American in a 
country that considers itself bi-racial.  The note analyzes the racial ambiguity 
of the South Asian in two major historical contexts.  First, it provides an 
overview of the legal history of South Asian migration, the first “wave” of 
which occurred from 1885 to 1923.  It analyzes the various exclusionary laws 
(both state and federal) that set a framework for how to view and treat the 
common Indian migrant.  It further looks at California and the Pacific North-
west’s deliberate, xenophobic acts during this time period, such as the Bel-
lingham Riots and the Hindu-German Conspiracy Trial of 1918.  This por-
tion of the note concludes with a comparison of the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in two anticanonical cases, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind and Plessy 
v. Ferguson.  Bhagat Singh Thind’s blanket ban on an Indian resident ever 
being classified as a free white person for the purpose of naturalization was 
a direct result of the long-standing tensions between American workers, 
Congress, and the unwanted Indian migrant.  This exclusionary ruling set the 
stage for cautious, deliberate immigration reform less than fifty years later. 
 The second portion of the note analyzes the second “wave” of South 
Asian migration after the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  It 
seeks to answer the question of how South Asian Americans can seek 
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constitutional and political legitimacy after Brown v. Board of Education.  It 
also examines how the federal statute has provided access to only a certain 
type of immigrant, therefore heavily contributing to the “model minority” 
stereotype without ever being discriminatory on its face.  The statute created 
a modern South Asian America, giving South Asians access to whiteness and 
its capitalistic benefits while denying them true and equal protection under 
the law.  The nature of the INA reduced South Asians to a limbo “other” 
category that is neither black nor white.  The note then analyzes modern 
South Asians, such as Dinesh D’Souza, Nikki Haley, and South Asian Amer-
ican activist groups, and how they have sought to create a politically legiti-
mate space for themselves in the space of the “other.”  Finally, this note con-
cludes by calling for a deeper South Asian American political engagement; 
one that recognizes the xenophobic and exclusionary history of Indian mi-
gration instead of simply benefitting from the access to white privilege and 




 South Asian American political legitimacy has boomed in the twenty-
first century.  The stereotype of the docile Asian is alive and well, but South 
Asians are starting to disrupt previously unoccupied spaces in politics and 
literature.  Surprisingly, the most famous or notorious political figures of 
South Asian descent have been political conservatives.  South Asians are a 
staunchly liberal group by all statistics, voting Democratic more than any 
other Asian American demographic.1  The note seeks to understand why 
some of the most prominent South Asian Americans in politics have begun 
to support legislation similar to the exclusionary policies that existed to dis-
enfranchise their ancestors.   
 The first portion of the note explores the earliest period of Indian mi-
gration from 1885 to 1923 in juxtaposition with Plessy v. Ferguson.  During 
the period between the Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 and the Immigra-
tion Act of 1917 (or Asiatic Barred Zone Act), two major waves of Indian 
immigrants, Punjabi laborers in the Pacific Northwest and intellectuals pur-
suing a degree at the University of California (now University of California, 
Berkeley), formed an unlikely pairing.  Together, the two groups formulated 
the development and rise of the Ghadar Party, a response to British colonial 
rule in India.  This political party, inspired by American ideals of emancipa-
tion and independence, attracted the concern of British intelligence officers 
stationed in the United States.  Less than twenty years after the party’s con-
ception, over 100 Indian immigrants stood accused of conspiring to over-
throw a foreign government.  Most of these men were put on trial, convicted, 
 
 1.  ERIKA LEE, THE MAKING OF ASIAN AMERICA 24 (1st ed. 2015). 
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and eventually deported.2  The Hindu-German Conspiracy Trial of 1918 was 
the beginning of the end of early Indian migration.  Thanks to the convictions 
and the already arbitrary nature of naturalization in the United States, the 
Supreme Court abruptly declared Indians would never be considered “white” 
under the naturalization statute in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind.3  This 
officially ended a turbulent, conflicting, and highly exclusionary period of 
Indian immigration to the United States.   
 The second part of the note discusses the passage of the INA and its 
subsequent effects on South Asian Americans.  It also seeks to answer how 
South Asian Americans can seek both constitutional and political legitimacy 
after Brown v. Board of Education in a country where they are not defined 
as either white or Black.  The INA added skills and family reunification cat-
egories, thus creating a remarkably different South Asian American popula-
tion.  These immigrants were highly skilled or often had a highly skilled 
family member already in the United States.  The new face of South Asian 
immigration gave them access to a level of privilege that was unprecedented, 
and also initiated the backhanded compliment of being a “model minority,” 
someone who quietly conforms to white societal norms and quickly over-
comes adversity without using government assistance.  
On its face, the INA claimed to be reformative and a representation of 
American ideals.  It created a strange political landscape for South Asians, 
however, who took two divergent paths to gain political legitimacy in coun-
try which had historically excluded them, yet currently welcomed a certain 
subset of them.  Some South Asians preached the conservative rhetoric that 
had excluded their ancestors less than a century before to gain respect and 
power.  They utilized the model minority myth and further pushed for the 
notion that an ideal American immigrant should be productive and submis-
sive in order to be considered desirable by pre-existing society.  Others for-
mally organized with other immigrant communities to research and criticize 
the discriminatory nature of immigration and labor laws.  The current South 
Asian American is not white but is granted certain benefits of whiteness in 
exchange for promoting “good immigrant” stereotypes and anti-black rheto-
ric.   
First and foremost, it is necessary to understand how the terms “Indian” 
and “South Asian” have evolved as a result of history.  India was a colony 
of the British Empire, and what constituted “India” back then is today’s ge-
ographical regions of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.  In 1947, India gained 
independence from the British Empire and divided into India, West Pakistan, 
and East Pakistan.  In 1971, East Pakistan was officially recognized as 
 
 2.  JOAN M. JENSEN, PASSAGE FROM INDIA: ASIAN IMMIGRANTS IN NORTH AMERICA 225 
(1988).  
 3. See United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1923).  
HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A SOLUTION? 
Spring 2021 HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A SOLUTION? 511 
Bangladesh, while West Pakistan was just Pakistan.  Therefore, the word 
“India” in a pre-1947 context encompasses all three modern day countries.  
Likewise, the term “South Asian” developed as a result of the 1947 India-
Pakistan partition.  The word “South Asian” currently encompasses several 
countries: present day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.  
The word “India” used in the post-1947 context therefore means today’s cur-
rent geographical region of India.  
 
I.  Early Indian Migration from 1885 to 1923 
 
  A.  Setting the Stage through Statutory History 
 
The rapid industrialization of the United States at the end of the nine-
teenth century, combined with the recent abolition of slavery, led to a newly 
heightened demand for immigrant labor.  A statute preceding the Alien Con-
tract Labor Law of 1885 actually encouraged immigration to the United 
States by supporting industries that paid passage for immigrant workers in 
exchange for their labor.4  The law was eventually repealed but demonstrated 
a time in early American history where foreign labor was supported and even 
encouraged.  Furthermore, the 1858 Burlingame Treaty established China as 
the most favored nation in terms of immigrant labor,5 but this privilege was 
quickly taken away due to anti-Chinese sentiment stemming from the cheap 
and plentiful labor provided by China.  California led this movement with 
the Anti-Coolie Act of 1862,6 leading to the federal exclusion of people of 
Chinese descent under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.  The enactment 
and repeal of these statutory laws finally led to the blanket ban on any com-
pany or institution paying for the transportation of foreign labor.7  The statute 
was facially discriminatory, targeting the resented “coolie” labor provided 
by China while providing exemptions for skilled workers, those who worked 
outside of a unionized industry, artists, and servants.8  This allowed Southern 
and Eastern European immigrants to keep migrating to the East Coast, since 
many of them were either facing religious persecution, or belonged to indus-
tries that were not unionized.  
 
 
 4. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
67 (2006).  
 5. Burlingame-Seward Treaty, China-U.S., Jul. 28, 1858, 16 Stat. 739.  
 6. Anti-Coolie Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340, repealed by Chinese Exclusion 
Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.  
 7. Alien Contract Labor (Foran) Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, §1, 23 Stat. 332, 333 (re-
pealed 1868).  
 8. EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY, 1798–1965, at 89 (1981). 
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 B.  “Undesirables” and a Rise in Punjabi Labor  
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was a direct response to the grow-
ing hostility among white laborers against Chinese laborers, who they felt 
were in direct competition for their labor jobs.  The hostility, mostly centered 
in the West, often escalated to violence even after the passage of this xeno-
phobic legislation.  By 1907, Chinese laborers were driven from Washington 
state, creating a wider space for Indian labor.9  Subsequently, the Asiatic 
Exclusion League (AEL), an association dedicated to organization of anti-
Asian sentiment and legislation, began to target Indians in response to the 
rise in the Indian workforce.10  Many laborers, already prevalent in the rail-
road industry, had begun to work in Washington lumber mills.11  This new 
wave of mill workers settled into an area that was already deeply distrustful 
of any Asiatic influence.  Sikh men attempting to preserve their cultural iden-
tity were particularly easy to target because of their turbans.  The AEL, 
mostly led by white laborers, pushed to exclude all Indian labor after Labor 
Day in 1907.12   
When Indian workers showed up for work the Tuesday after the holi-
day, white mill workers turned their anger into violence.  Several Indians 
were beaten in defense of “white womanhood.”13  The police continued to 
ignore these signs of growing unrest and violence, and eventually, what is 
now known as the Bellingham Riots began.  The police were so understaffed 
and in fear of these young laborers that they eventually acquiesced to the 
violence, allowing the laborers to beat and even stone Indian men in Belling-
ham.14  The police chief allowed the rioters to use the city hall to house In-
dian laborers as an unofficial jail.15  Eventually, the rioters were exhausted 
and the violence ended on its own accord without any support from law en-
forcement.16  Similar riots occurred during this time period in Vancouver 
(Canada), Everett (Washington), and St. John (Oregon).  
This began a wave of anti-Indian language in West Coast publications, 
coupled with an underlying support for white mill workers organizing 
 
 9. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 43. 
 10. Id. at 44. 
 11. Id. at 40. 
 12. Id. at 45. 
 13. Id.  
 14. BELLINGHAM HERALD, Sept. 2, 1907, at 7. 
 15. Id.  
 16. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 46. 
HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A SOLUTION? 
Spring 2021 HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A SOLUTION? 513 
against cheap Asian labor.17  Indians were labeled as “undesirables” with 
dirty turbans and as a threat to the American economy.18  
 
 C.  The “Fresh Air of Freedom” and Development of the Ghadar Party  
 
British rule in India (referred to as the British Raj) meant that Indian 
labor and migration held a delicate role in world politics.  The British Raj 
existed from 1858 to 1947 and established two major policies that affected 
Indian migration during this time period.  First, the British used their own 
rigid class system to better understand the Indian caste system, which was a 
paradigmatic classification scheme reserving jobs and occupations to differ-
ent people based on their group.  The British codified the Indian caste system 
and reserved powerful administrative positions to those belonging to higher 
castes.19  British administrators relied on eugenics, using the length of an 
Indian’s nose to codify the seven different castes.20  These policies were a 
precursor to the same arguments that Indians in the United States would try 
and use to gain naturalization.  
The second effect of the British Raj was that Indians were a significant 
part of the British military in World War I, which was around the same time 
that Indian unrest against the British Raj began to develop.  1.4 million Brit-
ish soldiers fought in World War I, a large portion of which were residents 
of India, leading to a global presence and subsequent League of Nations 
membership after the war.21  Indian leaders began to call for a self-governed 
nation.22  The proliferation of Indian portrayal in the worldwide media and 
the literal proliferation of Indian people themselves created a new level of 
tension between British rule and India.  
Specifically, British politicians began to fear that the “fresh air of free-
dom” in the United States would promulgate ideas of emancipation and un-
rest among Indian immigrants, and that these ideas would then be taken back 
to the subcontinent and used to overthrow the British (they were not wrong 
in this assumption).23  Many of these Indian men were agricultural workers 
subsisting off two to three dollars per day, but they formed communities of 
 
 17. Mary Lane Gallagher, 1907 Bellingham Mob Forced East Indian Mill Workers Out of 
Town, BELLINGHAM HERALD, (Sept. 2, 2007, 12:01 AM), https://www.bellinghamher-
ald.com/news/local/article22195713.html. 
 18. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 51.  
 19. NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, CASTES OF MIND: COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
INDIA 198-225 (2001).   
 20. See generally THOMAS R. TRAUTMANN, ARYANS AND BRITISH INDIA (2005).  
 21. JUDITH M. BROWN, MODERN INDIA: THE ORIGINS OF AN ASIAN DEMOCRACY 195 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 22. Id.  
 23. MAIA RAMNATH, HAJ TO UTOPIA 19 (2011).  
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resistance and strength.24  The Sikh community, in particular, created multi-
ple gurdwaras, or Sikh places of worship, as community centers where la-
borers could seek legal assistance to negotiate terms, find group living ar-
rangements, and procure jobs.25   
As infrastructure developed, other Indians came to the United States 
seeking the fresh air of freedom through higher education.  University of 
California organized scholarships to sponsor Indian students, and Indian pe-
riodicals published pieces on how to live and create a life in America.26  One 
of the members of the selection committee for these scholarships was Har 
Dayal, a future Indian freedom fighter.27  Unsurprisingly, many of the stu-
dents selected also possessed radical notions of freeing India from British 
imperialism.28   
It is unclear who radicalized who, but this unlikely duo of Indian farmer 
and student groups and interests were organized and often won the sympathy 
of leftist Americans, who were also against British rule.29  The early Ghada-
rites, as they called themselves, published writings that praised American 
ideals and thoughts as the catalyst for their own political movements back at 
home.30  Gobind Behari Lal, one of the first organizers of the Ghadar Party, 
stated that the unique combination of university bred intellectuals and farm-
ers who possessed the discipline that accompanied manual labor, was the 
movement’s most “outstanding characteristic.”31  The pressures of the Asi-
atic Exclusion League and other white laborers, however, forced policymak-
ers and legislators to ostracize Indian workers and intellectuals without ex-
plicitly banning them.  In response, Dayal gave an impassioned speech that 
reframed the immigration battle Indians were fighting in America.  He called 
for a liberated India, claiming that “as long as the Indians remained in sub-
jection to the British, they would not be treated as equals by Americans or 
any other nation.”32   
The Dillingham Commission was created in 1907 as a bipartisan special 
committee of Congress in order to understand the recent wave of migration 
to the United States and its subsequent effect on the American people.33  This 
Commission undertook research and proposed ideas until 1911.34  In partic-
ular, the Commission recommended policies that would negatively impact 
 
 24. RAMNATH, supra note 23, at 19. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 20. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 23 
 30. RAMNATH, supra note 23, at 23. 
 31. Id. at 22. 
 32. Id. at 33. 
 33. Id. at 24. 
 34. Id. 
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Indian workers without explicitly banning them, such as a literacy test for 
Indians or a “gentleman’s agreement” with Britain to restrict the number of 
Indians leaving the Indian subcontinent.35  A 1910 immigration report spe-
cifically stated that Indians were “universally regarded as the least desirable 
race of immigrants thus admitted to the United States.”36  This report pre-
ceded an early draft of the 1917 Immigration Act, which contained an 
amendment stating that any foreign immigrant coming to the United States 
to conspire with other foreign nationals to overthrow a foreign government 
would be deported.37  Although this amendment never made it to the con-
gressional floor for debate, it marks the specific yet general way legislators 
in Congress at the time sought to exclude Indians implicitly.  Indian workers 
(and subsequently early members of the Ghadar Party) were in a different 
and even more delicate position than their Asian counterparts purely because 
of the Indians’ subordinate relationship to Britain.  
 
 D.  The Hindu-German Conspiracy Trial of 1918  
 
 In March of 1914, American immigration authorities began deportation 
proceedings against Dayal because of his anarchist teachings.38  He escaped 
to Europe, leaving an associate, Mahesh Ram Chandra, as the de facto leader 
of the party.39  Also in 1914, a forty-one page pamphlet titled Deutschland—
Indiens Hoffnung (Germany—India’s Hope) was published and circulated to 
captured Indian soldiers in Germany (Indian soldiers made up a significant 
part of the British Army).40  The British became increasingly concerned with 
a transnational Indian expatriate network that would gain skills and resources 
to use against British rule in India.41  They began covert surveillance activi-
ties and sent numerous undercover agents to the Pacific Coast, pressuring the 
Justice Department to arrest political activists42 and culminating in the infa-
mous 1918 Hindu-German conspiracy trial in San Francisco.   
 The term “Hindu conspiracy” itself was a successful trial strategy used 
by the prosecution.  Thanks to the exclusionists’ concerted efforts to restrict 
Asian immigration, the people of California equated the word “Hindu” with 
the xenophobic legislation that the AEL pushed for.  The activities of Indian 
revolutionaries were further criticized and even labeled as a criminal con-
spiracy, in which at least two people are working together to perform some 
 
 35. RAMNATH, supra note 23, at 24. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 185. 
 39. Id. at 190.  
 40. Id. at 196. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 214.  
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sort of illegal act.43  This extended the definition of the conspiracy statute by 
applying it to political activism.  If the jury could believe that political activ-
ism was a crime, then the prosecution had done its job.  Specifically, the 
prosecution directed the jury to a neutrality law that prohibited organizing a 
military expedition against a nation with which the United States was at 
peace.44   
 As evidence, the prosecution used a series of communications between 
Britain and the United States that included: memos debating the conse-
quences of letting the Ghadar Party stay in California; detailed reports of 
activities by Indian revolutionaries; a complaint of international conspiracy 
regarding a German arms shipment to Indians in California; and finally, a 
complaint against the editor of a newspaper who allegedly incited murder, 
arson, and assassination.45  These reports were frequent, excitable, and often 
had no conclusory findings.   
 On May 1, 1917, Ram Chandra and seven other Indians were finally 
indicted by a grand jury.46  Trial commenced in November 1917 and contin-
ued for five months, in which the prosecution broadened the scope of “mili-
tary expedition or enterprise” to include any sort of political activism in order 
to convict the men on trial.  The prosecution, aided by British documents and 
witnesses, painted an elaborate picture of a Hindu conspiracy orchestrated 
by Germans in the United States who were trying to stir up an Indian revo-
lution in order to distract British Armed Forces from World War I.47  
 The trial was long and messy.  The Court disregarded hearsay rules and 
admitted poorly authenticated evidence, and the prosecution painted the In-
dians as sneaky, plotting spies.48  The trial also increased tensions amongst 
the defendants, which culminated in Ram Chandra being shot and killed in 
the courtroom by another co-defendant.49  The prosecution succeeded in dis-
tinguishing Indian freedom from British rule from the American Revolution-
ary War.  By painting the Indians as spies and secret plotters working with 
Germans (a public enemy in 1918), no jury would see this Indian struggle as 
anything close to what their ancestry endured at the hands of the British.50  
All Indian defendants were convicted.  A country founded on political free-
dom and refuge from oppression publicly approved the oppression of another 
people and disparaged any political uprising.   
 
 43. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 216.  
 44. Id. at 214.  
 45. See JENSEN, supra note 2, at 215.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 223.  
 48. Id. at 224. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 225. 
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Despite both the trial and British concern, scholars have never been able 
to definitively determine the extent to which Germany offered assistance to 
rebels in India.51  It is unclear how much assistance was given, what it was 
for, or even when it started and ended.52  There has also been little to no 
analysis of the effect this ambiguous level of assistance actually had on the 
Indian independence front.53  For example, Ram Chandra, leader of the party 
and editor of the newspaper accused of inciting violence, was not held re-
sponsible for the crimes in question.54  The graphics and articles in the news-
paper were “brutal” but also an honest political critique of the British Empire 
in India.55  The arms shipment, however, became the central dispute in liti-
gation because it carried the most ambiguity.  Any men involved with the 
arms shipment who were also in the San Francisco Ghadar Party were put on 
the Justice Department’s lists of watched individuals.56  There was no proof, 
however, that the arms were being used for a military expedition in India to 
overthrow British rule.57  The British and United States state departments 
went back and forth; the United States was concerned with fair prosecution 
and not admitting faulty evidence, while Britain continued to push for na-
tional security as the priority.58   
 
II.  Political tensions and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind 
 
 A.  The Arbitrary Method to Naturalization before Thind  
 
Naturalization, according to the first Congress in 1790, has always been 
granted only to those who were classified as “white.”59  After the Civil War, 
Congress amended the naturalization statute to include those of African de-
scent, but explicitly made it clear that all other immigrants seeking naturali-
zation must be “white.”60  The meaning of the word “white” continued to be 
a point of debate once Asian Indians started seeking naturalization in the 
early twentieth century.   
Applying for citizenship was complex, federally unregulated, and often 
did not rely on any statutory interpretation.61  The issue of whether the ap-
plicant was “white” or not was decided by the clerks of the court, since 
 
 51. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 184. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 219. 
 55. Id. 
 56. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 220.  
 57. Id. at 217. 
 58. Id. at 222.  
 59. Id. at 246. 
 60. Id. at 247. 
 61. Id.  
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Congress had yet to define the boundaries of the statute.62  Clerks were not 
required to provide reasoning for their decisions.  To add to the confusion, a 
convention between the United States and England in 1870 made it so that 
citizens of one country were eligible to be naturalized in the other but did not 
clarify whether that holding extended to subjects of British colonial rule.63  
The United States Attorney General Charles Bonaparte declared eventually 
that “[i]t seems to me clear that under no construction of the law can natives 
of British India be regarded as white persons.”64   
Although California exclusionists welcomed Bonaparte’s sentiment, 
courts were not bound to follow it.65  For example, Abdullah Dolla came 
prepared to his hearing; despite the United States Attorney Office’s opposi-
tion to his admission, Dolla had a deputy collector and a white doctor testify 
to his Caucasian heritage.66  The judge listened to this testimony and asked 
to examine Dolla’s arms, since they had received less sun exposure.67  He 
declared Dolla white because his skin was pale enough to show the blue 
veins running underneath it.68  Thus, federal courts continued to interpret the 
statute on their own and disregarded the United States Attorney Office’s ar-
guments.  This led to a slew of arbitrary decisions in which Indians gained 
citizenship based on a strange combination of “scientific” findings, a per-
son’s heritage, and what the common man understood to be white. 
On the other hand, federal district court judge Henry A. Smith in South 
Carolina used even more arbitrary reasoning to define the word “white” in 
terms of granting citizenship.  He looked to the framers’ intent when writing 
the statute in 1790, a time when the word “Caucasian” or “Aryan” held no 
meaning to the writers.69  The applicant in question was Faras Shahid, a 
Christian Syrian man who claimed that his Syrian heritage made him a mem-
ber of the Indo-European race that included Persians (Persians at that time 
had received citizenship because they were considered Caucasian).70  Smith 
accepted this reasoning, but denied Shahid citizenship because in 1790, the 
word “white” did not include the geographic regions of Caucasian people.71  
Therefore, Smith used textualism and common meaning to define the word 
“white” in the most exclusionary way possible, referring only to “white Eu-
ropeans and their descendants.”  The word was limited by what it meant in 
1790 when it was written.   
 
 62. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 247.   
 63. Id. at 248. 
 64. Id. at 248.  
 65. Id. at 249.  
 66. See United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101 (5th Cir. 1910).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. JENSEN, supra note 2, at 253–54.   
 70. See Ex parte Shahid, 205 Fed. 812 (1913).  
 71. Id.  
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Furthermore, while Shahid and other Persians could be descended from 
European conquerors, Smith ruled that “the conqueror seems to have been 
soon swallowed up in an enormously preponderant brown or black people of 
difference race” and that this “dark-colored people” was the controlling race 
for these applicants.72  Perhaps to appeal to exclusionists, Smith further ar-
ticulated his racist theories, claiming that if he allowed these vague descend-
ants of Europeans to be citizens, then he would have to open the door to 
Chinese and Japanese applicants, who very well could have European herit-
age way back in their ancestry.73  Smith created the borders and subsequently 
determined whether applicants could qualify as white.  He upheld his deci-
sion in later cases, telling an applicant that if the interpretation of the statute 
seemed arbitrary or even absurd, it was the job of Congress or the Supreme 
Court to settle this matter.74   
 
 B.  External Pressures Leading to Thind’s Holding 
 
Some courts followed Smith’s reasoning, while other courts, including 
those in California, continued to interpret the statute using the arguments that 
Dolla and Shahid had brought in their defense.75  These inconsistencies 
prompted the Supreme Court to clarify and create a single line of reasoning, 
first in Ozawa v. United States, and a year later in United States v. Bhagat 
Singh Thind. 
Smith’s arbitrary criteria for determining who was white started to gain 
traction in the Supreme Court in the 1920s.  Justice Sutherland delivered the 
opinion of the court for Ozawa, in which he denounced the color of some-
one’s skin being the legal test for naturalization.76  Instead, Sutherland said 
that the word “white” extended to persons of the Caucasian race, including 
Indians.77  That being said, Sutherland anticipated the problem of equating 
“white person” with “Caucasian” and said that cases in the gray area would 
have to be decided individually.78  Since Ozawa, a Japanese immigrant, was 
not Caucasian by clear evidence of science, then he was not eligible for citi-
zenship.79   
Ozawa created a legal context for Thind to make his argument before 
the Court.  Ozawa was born in Japan but had lived in the United States for 
twenty years.80  He attended the University of California, educated his 
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children in American schools, and attended an American church.81  He was, 
by all means, a model immigrant.  Ozawa lost purely because he was not 
white, and in Sutherland’s eyes, Congress meant “white” to include only de-
scendants of the Caucasian race.     
Thind was born in Punjab, India and attended Punjab University until 
he came to the United States in 1913.82  He continued studying at the Uni-
versity of California but was not associated with the predecessors of the 
Ghadar Party at the time.83  When his loyalty to India was questioned, he 
admitted his support for an India free from British rule but openly denounced 
any armed rebellion.84  Most importantly, Thind was a United States war 
veteran and was honorably discharged with glowing performance reviews.85  
He was a model immigrant like Ozawa in every way, and furthermore, Thind 
would argue his Aryan ancestors, who invaded Punjab centuries ago, were 
Caucasian.  Since Justice Sutherland had explicitly expressed his support for 
the Caucasian race in Ozawa, Thind’s attorneys believed that a model immi-
grant such as himself, with a direct tie to the Caucasian race, would secure a 
pathway to naturalization for Thind and all future applicants. Thind would 
also argue that his high-caste status in India was similar to the white man’s 
exclusion of Black Americans.86  High-caste Indians were not allowed to 
interact with or marry lower caste Indians, similar to the anti-miscegenation 
laws in the United States at the time.87  Thind had evidentiary support tying 
him to the Caucasian race, making him a white man according to the prece-
dent set forth in Ozawa.  
Thind brought his case to a federal district court in Oregon in 1920, 
under the naturalization law of 1906.88  This law was Congress’s first attempt 
at creating uniform immigration and naturalization laws and established a 
bureau to handle these matters.  The law required that an applicant learn 
English to be considered for naturalization.89  Despite the liberal attitude of 
the nearby California courts, the bureau denied Thind’s application.90  By 
1920, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act was also in effect, which barred Indians 
from entering the United States but did not answer the question of whether 
Indians already in the country were eligible for citizenship.91  On appeal, the 
judge decided that the Asiatic Barred Zone Act did not retroactively apply to 
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Indian naturalization and granted Thind citizenship.92  Of course, the bureau 
appealed the case, which finally reached the Supreme Court in 1923.93   
The Court was not persuaded by Thind’s reasoning.  Anthropological 
and scientific evidence tying Indians to the Caucasian race was disregarded 
by the Justices, who wrote a unanimous opinion in 1923.94  Regardless of 
what the evidence presented, the Court choose to employ yet another criteria 
to push their exclusionary agenda, that of “the common man.”  When inter-
preting the statute, the Court argued that the phrase “free white persons,” a 
common man’s phrase, should be used instead of “Caucasian,” a word of 
scientific origin.95  This is because in 1790, the word “Caucasian” was not 
used and carried no meaning to the framers (note that this is a reiteration of 
Smith’s argument in the North Carolina courts).96  Therefore, the word “Cau-
casian” is meant to aid the legislative intent of the statute, and not substitute 
the words already written.97  Furthermore, the meaning of the word “Cauca-
sian” is unclear as to which people it includes.98  A common man, therefore, 
would not include Indians in his interpretation of “free white persons.”99  The 
Court concluded its point by drawing on the intent of the current Congress, 
as well.  Since the Asiatic Barred Zone Act had just passed less than a decade 
before, overruling a presidential veto, there was a clear “congressional atti-
tude of opposition” to Indians entering the United States.100  That logic could 
then extend to the fact that if Indians were being excluded from entering the 
country, they should also be excluded from applying for citizenship.101  The 
unanimous decision in Thind closed the door on the first, inconsistent chapter 
of Indian entry and naturalization to the United States. 
The aftermath of Thind created an opportunity for California exclusion-
ists to further ostracize Indians from their communities.  District attorneys in 
various counties began proceedings that revoked Indian purchases of land 
and terminated leases early.102  Officials began to refuse marriage licenses 
and, finally, cancelled naturalization papers of Indians, regardless of their 
political involvement.103  Justice departments eventually organized to adopt 
a uniform standard to exclude Indians from naturalization.  Nonetheless, 
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Indians continued to appeal and litigate their cases for years after the Thind 
decision.104   
Using the “common man” standard for what was considered to be white 
meant that what a person identified as was based on how well they passed 
for a certain race.  It was the first subjective legal test that governed the rights 
of an individual based on race.  This was a sharply different standard than 
the ones set forth in slave state statutes pre-Civil War, which denoted and 
identified how much white ancestry a slave would require to gain access to 
legal rights.  The shift from numerical amounts to subjective appearance al-
lowed for greater restrictions and arbitrary standards set by the judicial sys-
tem, leading to a tighter protection of white supremacy.  For example, the 
“common man” test in one instance was interpreted to include mixed people 
of color; a common man would only consider a person white if a quarter or 
more of their blood lineage was proven to be white.105 
 
  C.  Plessy v. Ferguson Paved a Difficult Path to Naturalization  
 
The touchstone of modern equal protection analysis is discriminatory 
legislative intent; this is a far cry from the strict textualist approach used to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.106  The decision in the landmark and later reversed Supreme Court 
case Plessy v. Ferguson was consistent with the older, original understanding 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  A showing of discriminatory legislative in-
tent was not even required when Plessy was decided.107  This is because seg-
regation as a policy was considered to be a part of social order and, therefore, 
could not have been intentionally discriminatory; Plessy was decided seven 
to one.108 
Thind was decided only twenty-seven years after Plessy, while separate 
but equal policies were still an established part of society.  Even though none 
of the Justices on the Court were the same, the same sentiment rang strong 
and true.  Like the Plessy Court, the Justices in Thind did not consider any 
potential discriminatory intent behind the naturalization statute.  Instead, the 
Court maintained its textualist, plain language approach.  Naturalization be-
ing contingent on white lineage was automatically upheld due to the plain 
reading of the statutory text.  
This reliance on an original reading of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
strictly because the Court did not want to address the uncomfortable notion 
of association.  The Court was unwilling to acknowledge a society in which 
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recently liberated slaves would occupy the same spaces as their former own-
ers, and where naturalization was granted objectively and not for the purpose 
of protecting white males.  What did it mean for Homer Plessy to have the 
right to sit in a train car among white passengers?  What did it mean for 
Bhagat Singh to achieve identical status as a German or Irish immigrant?  
The Court maintained its position as a gatekeeper to an integrated society, 
using textualism and plain language to uphold the social order of the time.  
The Fourteenth Amendment was Congress’ first foray into civil rights, 
but the legislature began its journey hesitantly.  It entertained and permitted 
the right to own property, the right to contract, and the right to contribute to 
the economy and capitalism at large.  This did not include the right to asso-
ciate, to intermarry, to bear children with, and to receive the same respect 
and treatment as to that of a free white person.  This is the precursor to “racial 
capitalism,” which is the practice of deriving only social and economic value 
from the acknowledgment of another’s racial identity.109  The decisions in 
Plessy and Thind touted falsely progressive values by acknowledging the 
presence of Black and Indian Americans to the degree that it was useful and 
comfortable.  Simultaneously, they continued to allow white Americans and 
United States citizens to barely tolerate the presence of others without feeling 
forced to do so.  This left Indian Americans to ask an uncomfortable ques-
tion: are we Black or are we white?  
 
IV.  Neither Black nor White: The 1965 Immigration and Nationality 
Act and its Consequences on South Asian America 
 
  A.  Brown v. Board of Education and its Abandonment of Textualism  
 
Brown v. Board of Education reversed the holding in Plessy by doing 
away with the “separate but equal” doctrine.  Brown took a sharp turn in its 
abandonment of the strictly textual reading of the legislation and of court 
precedent, instead relying on sociological studies and the future-facing effect 
that discrimination would have on children of color.110  The lesser cited, 
equally curious concurrence from Justice Jackson also highlights that the 
change in times required a different reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Similar arguments were made in Loving v. Virginia and affirmative action 
cases.  
Thanks to the rapidly evolving legal landscape of equal protection anal-
ysis under Brown, South Asian Americans were finally granted equal pro-
tection under the law, less than fifty years after Thind.  Yet several modern 
South Asian Americans continue to seek political legitimacy through 
 
 109. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
 110. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  
HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A SOLUTION? 
524 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Vol. 48:3 
conservative means, employing “good immigrant” stereotypes, promoting 
anti-blackness and championing exclusionary policies through textualist in-
terpretations of statutes not dissimilar to the ones that kept them out of the 
United States.   
 
  B.  South Asian Americans and a Tri-Racial America   
 
The placement of South Asian Americans in twentieth century politics 
and media has always been ambivalent and contradictory, in part due to the 
racial and religious diversity of South Asia.  Immigrants from South Asia 
may be Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Catholic or Protestant.  They possess 
a wide variety of physical characteristics and skin tones.  Furthermore, some 
Hindus may choose to strongly identify with the caste and community they 
grew up in, while other Hindus may be the product of inter-caste marriages 
and have no cultural tie to the caste.  And finally, indigenous Native Ameri-
cans have long been mistakenly referred to as “Indians,” adding to the con-
fusion and diverse array of populations here in the United States.  
Thind formally declared that Indians would never be white, and yet in 
the 1970 national census, Asian Indians were classified as “white.”  Later 
critical race theorists have identified South Asians as “honorary whites,”111 
which calls into question the idea of America being a bi-racial country in 
which all its residents must conform to either whiteness or Blackness.  Is 
America becoming “tri-racial,” and if so, is the third race simply “other” or 
“brown”?  
Racialization theory uses the legal history and processes of racial dis-
crimination to set up a hierarchy among people.112  The concept of racializa-
tion can go beyond statutes, however, and extend to the informal stereotypes, 
media portrayals, and microaggressions that people encounter on a daily ba-
sis.113  Further theories build on the idea of “racial capitalism,” which estab-
lishes the notion that white supremacy and a claim to “whiteness” allow the 
individual to gain property, financial capital, and a general reputation for 
success.114 
It is easy to understand how racial capitalism has allowed white suprem-
acy to benefit off the exploitation and misuse of colored bodies and labor.  
The most notorious example, of course, was the legal institution of slavery 
until 1865, which allowed the American economy to boom and develop due 
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to the unpaid slaves’ labor that white American slave-owners benefited from.  
This is the most direct example of both statutes and capitalism allowing the 
white, male population to comfortably sit on top of a racial hierarchy of their 
own creation.  A newer example is the H-1B worker’s visa, which allows 
United States employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty 
occupations.  H-1B visas grant South Asian workers access to “whiteness” 
by benefitting from a higher paid job, while also being discriminated against 
and exploited, due to the visa’s vague and ambiguous standards.   
H-1B visas have no doubt changed the landscape of South Asian Amer-
ica, ushering in hundreds of thousands of engineers and doctors and labelling 
Indians as the highest-earning minority in the United States.  But the visa 
continues to exploit workers through substandard working conditions, less 
pay, and the ever-present threat of being deported if the worker is fired.115  
The creation of the visa has allowed the United States to tie labor perfor-
mance to the right to remain in this country.  Simultaneously, South Asian 
workers under the H-1B program have positive access to racial capitalism 
while also being discriminated against for their non-citizen status.  It is un-
contested that it is a better time to be South Asian today than it was in 1923 
under Thind’s exclusionary ruling.  South Asians are positively portrayed as 
hardworking, intelligent and quiet.  They do not disrupt the status quo and 
are statistically less likely to complain about problems regarding their vi-
sas.116  Donald Trump, in an effort to reach the Indian American demo-
graphic (a group that consistently votes Democratic regardless of income), 
spoke in Hindi during a 2016 campaign ad.117  Regardless of these so-called 
“benefits,” however, South Asian Americans are also consistently denied ac-
cess to equal protection under the law under the creation of the H-1B visa.  
Furthermore, the 2018 Hate Crimes Report under the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigations shows a consistent increase of hate crimes against Hindus, 
Sikhs, and Muslims, in which over fifty percent of the perpetrators are 
white.118  In this manner, South Asian Americans teeter between the edges 
of both whiteness and blackness by gaining access and privilege to the praise 
and respect of the higher white class, but also continue to be the victims of 
hate crimes, microaggression and labor discrimination.  
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  C.  A Supposed Call for Immigration Reform  
 
President Johnson endorsed the INA as a conservative and cautious ap-
proach compared to the immigration reform enthusiastically supported by 
President Kennedy before him.119  Despite this muted endorsement, the INA 
is credited for modern Asian American immigration and hailed exactly as 
the sweeping change Johnson claimed it would not be.   
The INA did three things: it abolished national origin quotas; it created 
categorical methods of entry to the United States based on skills and family 
members; and it established a global cap on immigration.120  This made two 
major differences: it increased the overall population of Asian Americans by 
creating new categories of entry, but also began the era of undocumented 
immigration due to the global cap.121   
Most South Asian immigrants today have no relation to the farmers and 
railroad workers that preceded them; instead, they represent the diversity of 
the region in terms of culture and skills.  The majority of these immigrants 
are Indian in a modern day, post-imperialistic context.  While most attention 
is given to the Indian H-1B worker, qualifying for entry through the skills-
based category set out by the United States, a significant number of Indians 
come through the family reunification process.  These immigrants do not 
have university degrees, and instead join their family members to own small 
businesses and franchises, most often gas stations, motels and taxicabs.   
 
  D.  South Asian Political Legitimacy and the “Good Immigrant”  
 
The creation of family reunification and skills categories in the INA put 
the South Asian population in a position of power they had never experi-
enced before.  A year after the statute’s passing and less than twenty years 
after the Japanese American internment, New York Times Magazine debuted 
the phrase “model minority.”122  The article compared Japanese American 
treatment in the United States to that of Black Americans, and marveled at 
their ability to overcome the severe discrimination they had faced.123  This 
ability was then compared to the sentiment among Black Americans, who 
were reacting negatively to “well-meaning programs” that Americans had 
selflessly provided with self-hatred and apathy.124  This was the beginning 
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of a modern America that put Asian Americans in a position of power and 
used Asian American stereotypes to legitimize anti-black sentiment.   
Texas Senator Phil Gramm made an unsuccessful bid for the Republi-
can nomination for President in 1996, a move that was supported by many 
South Asian Americans at the time.  He denounced the welfare system and 
how it rewarded American citizens for choosing not to work.125  Immigration 
reform and current policies were not the problem; if our own citizens will 
not get a job, why should we punish foreigners who are willing to work?126  
Conservative rhetoric in the 1990s gave South Asians the tools they needed 
to succeed.  Immigrants were good, Black Americans were not.  The lines 
separating communities of color continued to deepen further.   
Dinesh D’Souza is perhaps the most infamous and prolific example of 
a South Asian American using white conservative rhetoric to gain political 
legitimacy.  In 1995, his book The End of Racism openly criticized the plight 
of Black Americans by asking, “Why can’t an African American be more 
like an Asian?”127  He went on to claim that the struggles they faced were 
not because of institutional structures preventing them from success, but ra-
ther, the demise of the African civilization as a people.128  D’Souza’s book 
was widely criticized and denounced, leading to the current infamous repu-
tation he has today for right-wing apologist behavior.  The book denied 
America’s racial history, used facts pulled out of context to support its illog-
ical thesis, attacked Black American culture, and denounced the prohibition 
of private discrimination.129   
More than anything, however, D’Souza fails to recognize that South 
Asian America as he understands it is a fundamental product of the INA, a 
statute that pulled and exploited highly skilled foreign workers for the benefit 
of the American economy.  D’Souza is not surrounded by an accurate depic-
tion of the South Asian diaspora; rather, he is surrounded by a sliver of South 
Asian society: highly skilled workers and small business owners.  He fails to 
acknowledge the racial foundation of America, a country that would not have 
let him enter less than fifty years prior.  Furthermore, a conservative demo-
graphic can now hide behind the theories of people of color such as D’Souza.  
Conservatives can now claim that they are not pushing for white supremacy.  
They like some immigrants—the “good” ones.  They even have spokespeo-
ple standing up for their own beliefs and ideals; the “good” immigrants them-
selves had started to agree with them.   
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Nikki Haley, former South Carolina governor and Ambassador to the 
United Nations under the Trump administration, is another example of South 
Asian political legitimacy and all of its complexities.  Born to Indian Punjabi 
parents, Haley became the first Indian American governor of South Carolina 
in 2010 and was endorsed by both Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin.130  Alt-
hough the majority of Indian Americans have historically voted Democratic, 
Haley has been a staunch supporter of conservative ideals and continues to 
preach the conservative rhetoric that allowed her to gain power in the Amer-
ican South.   
In 2011, Haley signed a South Carolina state bill into law that called for 
heightened police power over immigration enforcement.131  The law made it 
a state crime to knowingly harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant, 
required immigrants to carry their federal registration documents at all times, 
and required all undocumented immigrants to be transferred from state to 
federal custody.132  The federal district court struck down the first two pro-
visions of the law and upheld the third, citing the Supremacy Clause in its 
reasoning.133  A representative for Haley stated that South Carolina had taken 
these measures because the federal government had not addressed illegal im-
migration adequately.134  Haley said of the bill, “[a]s the daughter of immi-
grants . . . this is a bill that enforces laws.”135  She went on to state that legal 
immigrants have gone through the required paperwork and measures that are 
enforced by the government, and that she did not support (and the state could 
not afford) immigrants who had cheated the system.136  Haley’s rhetoric was 
already divisive among immigrant communities for creating false stereo-
types and tensions between “good immigrants” and “bad immigrants.”  A 
co-sponsor of the bill took it one step further and denounced the illegal com-
munities that “cling together” and bring prostitution, gangs, drugs, and vio-
lence to the state of South Carolina.137 
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Haley is a more moderate conservative than the continuously criticized 
D’Souza.  She has also gained a level of political power that most South 
Asian Americans have not achieved.  Perhaps Haley believes in the con-
servative ideals that underlie her 2011 immigration bill, but does she also 
continue to preach them under the hopes that she will be taken seriously and 
gain political legitimacy?  The court decision striking down two provisions 
of the law set the legal stage for similar immigration laws to be brought to 
court by public interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
and Southern Poverty Law Center.138  It began a national debate and set a 
public forum for American citizens to weigh in on good versus bad immi-
grants.  It set the stage for Donald Trump to call Mexican immigrants “crim-
inals and rapists” during his announcement for the 2016 Presidential elec-
tion.139  What America saw from these bills and from a presidential candidate 
was that there were good immigrants and there were bad ones.   
Furthermore, what Haley did was establish herself as one of the “good 
ones.”  While she has preached conservative rhetoric in a less alarming man-
ner than D’Souza in The End of Racism, she has perpetuated the same ideals 
by turning communities of color against each other.  Where D’Souza was 
mainly concerned with the civil rights of Black Americans, Haley added 
Latin American immigrants to this growing pot of communities that South 
Asians saw themselves as superior to.  Her family had come to this country 
legally (her parents also both held advanced degrees); they had worked hard 
and established roots, and, therefore, they were more deserving of American 
humanity.  Never mind that the first Indian American elected to Congress, 
Dilip Saund Singh, was elected less than sixty years ago.  Never mind that 
Haley herself would not be allowed to marry her white, Methodist husband 
less than sixty years ago.  
After the Charleston church shooting in 2015, Haley signed a bill into 
law that permitted removing the Confederate flag from the grounds of the 
capitol and was widely praised for doing so.140  She noted that although the 
flag had its place among residents as a way to honor their ancestors, it was 
not a way to “represent the future of our great state.”141  A year later, Haley 
was nominated by President Trump to be ambassador to the United Nations 
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and was confirmed by the Senate in early 2017.142  She was simultaneously 
criticized for her significant lack of foreign policy experience.143  Both of 
Obama’s ambassadors, by contrast, had extensive foreign policy experi-
ence.144  Haley was neither the first, nor the last less-than-qualified member 
of Trump’s cabinet, 145 but it was nevertheless a surprise to see Trump’s first 
female appointment to the cabinet be a woman of color.  Furthermore, it was 
a huge gain of political power to Haley herself.  
It is important to note that once Haley had placed herself in a position 
of political legitimacy, she eased up on certain conservative ideals.  Her de-
nouncement of the Confederate flag was a surprise to the overwhelmingly 
Republican state, and she was steadfast in her decision.  Perhaps Haley’s 
support of conservative rhetoric was a deft political strategy.  She gained 
legitimacy by preaching to the ideals of her state’s demographic, and then 
expressed more moderate beliefs once she had a platform in which people 
listened to her.  She also did not initially support Trump’s candidacy and 
publicly called for the release of his financial records.146  Is Haley a true dema-
gogue of the white conservative vote, or is she a cunning political strategist? 
 
E.  South Asian Political Legitimacy and the “Disruptive Immigrant”   
 
The spirit of the Ghadar Party has mostly disappeared in twenty-first 
century South Asian America.  Few South Asian organizations exist in soli-
darity or in protest of American right-wing politics.  Despite this bleak out-
look, however, several women’s and LGBT South Asian groups have 
emerged in the fabric of South Asian American political dynamics.  The ma-
jority of these women’s groups seek to fight the patriarchal nature of the 
current immigration system, in which so many husbands possess legal status 
and rights over their wives.147  This puts survivors of domestic violence liv-
ing in the United States in an extremely precarious position.148  These organ-
izations exist on both coasts and seek to dismantle the sexist systems that 
prevent many women from gaining legal status.149   
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These organizations, such as Manavi, Sakhi, and South Asian Women 
for Action have undergone an extensive amount of legal research to disman-
tle the contradictory and exclusionary nature of immigration laws working 
against women’s rights.150  In particular, they focus on the amendments to 
the INA, the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, and the 1996 Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.151   
Under family reunification, a woman entering the United States on the 
basis of marriage (which is the majority of South Asian women) is a legal 
beneficiary of her husband’s status.152  As a result, she has no legal rights 
and no agency over her own immigration status.153  Furthermore, subsequent 
legislation has tried to attack fraudulent “green card marriages,” in which 
one spouse can gain permanent residency status (colloquially referred to as 
a “green card”) because he or she is married to a United States permanent 
resident.  The legislation mandates the permanent residency status of the 
spouse to be conditional upon the appeal process to Immigration and Nation-
ality Services (INS).154  The spouse’s permanent residency status is held in 
limbo for up to two years as the INS assesses whether the marriage was made 
in good faith.155  Subsequently, the data regarding “green-card marriages” 
was blown out of proportion and used to incite fear in United States citizens 
that immigrants were abusing the law to enter the country en masse.156  Fur-
thermore, women trapped in abusive marriages were bound during the limbo 
period, meaning that they must stay with their husbands during the two years 
in order to gain permanent residency.  If the woman wanted to leave her 
private residence in fear for her life, the INS could call that action into ques-
tion since it is a violation of a “good faith” marriage.   
One shining example of South Asians banding together in order to dis-
mantle a good immigrant myth and anti-blackness is the New York Taxi 
Workers’ Alliance (NYTWA).  The taxi system, while insignificant when 
compared to the underground subway labyrinth of New York City, is also 
the seventh largest transportation network in the country.157  Almost a third 
of cab drivers, who are overwhelmingly men of color, are members of the 
NYTWA.  Initially, however, taxi worker organizations were small and ad-
vocated for singular interests (i.e., fighting for South Asian cab drivers at the 
expense of Haitian or Latino drivers).158  Eventually, drivers began to make 
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individual, concerted efforts to join together different communities of color, 
instead of dividing them further by making conversations about ethnicity the 
forefront of the organization.159  Working together in solidarity of each 
other’s experiences was the best way to create unity among these fragmented 
organizations.160  Eventually, the leadership of the NYTWA became diverse 
and reflected the wide range of experiences of these drivers—Haitian, West 
African, Iranians, and Indians.161   
In 1998, 24,000 taxi workers, over half of whom were South Asian, 
went on three different strikes in three different months despite strong threats 
and coercion by City Hall and Rudy Giuliani, then mayor of New York 
City.162  The strike concerned seventeen different rules that heavily policed 
driver behavior at the expense of their dignity.163  Some rules promulgated a 
$1,000 fine for rude behavior and smoking.164   
During Giuliani’s tenure, the New York Police Department continued 
to harass immigrant drivers, often subjecting them to beatings and harsh ci-
tations for trivial infractions.165  Giuliani’s conservative rhetoric rang 
through his policy changes, as he presented himself as the responsible citizen 
concerned about the unruly immigrant who refused to comply.166  The 
NYTWA, a unified force of “bad immigrants,” did not have to stir up anger 
and resentment; it had been there for a long time coming.167  Angry with the 
success of the strikes, Giuliani signed an executive order that allowed the 
leasing companies renting the taxis to the drivers to encroach and enforce the 
taxi industry.168  In a massive victory for the NYTWA, the judiciary struck 
down the executive order.169  The city’s residents overwhelmingly supported 
the strike at eighty percent, resulting in a dramatic culmination in which over 
400 taxi drivers walked across the Queensboro Bridge in protest.170 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 The lens of history paints two historically and legally distinct South 
Asian Americas.  The first one is a bleak, exclusionary picture of legislators, 
unionized workers, and even foreign government officials fighting to 
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suppress Indian migration.  The second picture, while still controlled by the 
hand of implicitly discriminatory legislation, is nevertheless a brighter and 
more optimistic time for South Asian Americans.  This note seeks to find a 
connection between these two legally distinct Americas, one where the mod-
ern South Asian reaping the benefits of racial capitalism is able to look back 
at the tide of xenophobic legislation with a sharp and critical eye.  The INA 
was signed into law less than fifty years after the Supreme Court declared 
that Indians would never be white.  Change does not happen overnight; de-
liberate immigration reform did not happen in half a century.  South Asian 
Americans need to understand how the Immigration and Nationality Act has 
granted preference and privilege to one immigrant community at the expense 
of another.  Once the “model minority” is willing to grapple with this un-
comfortable truth, there is no choice but to politically engage with the con-
sequences of being neither black nor white, but “other.” 
